Georgian law provides for the recognition and enforcement of both final arbitral awards and interim measures. Pursuant to Article 21(1) of LOA, an interim measure issued by an arbitral tribunal is binding and must be enforced by filing an application to a court, regardless of the country in which the interim measure was rendered.
Pursuant to Article 45(1) of LOA, which mirrors the grounds of Article V of the New York Convention:
“Recognition or enforcement of an arbitration award, irrespective of the country in which it is rendered, may be refused only if:
a) the party against whom the award isrenderedapplies to the court and furnishes proof that:
a.a) a party, when executing the arbitration agreement, was legally incapable or was a beneficiary of support and a guardian was appointed for this party with relation to the issues under the arbitration agreement, but the support has not been obtained, or the said agreement is not valid or is null and void under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the state where the award was rendered;
a.b) the party was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his/her case;
a.c) the arbitration award is rendered on a dispute that was not submitted to the arbitral tribunal by the parties, or the arbitration award contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the request submitted to the arbitral tribunal. Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced;
a.d) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure did not comply with the agreement of the parties, or in the cases of absence of such an agreement, did not comply with the law of the country where the arbitration took place;
a.e) the arbitration award has not yet become binding on the parties or has been set aside or suspended by a court of the country in which, or under the law of which, the award was made;
b) the court finds that:
b.a) the subject-matter of the dispute may not be settled by arbitration under the legislation of Georgia;
b.b) the award is in conflict with the public order.”
As the wording “irrespective of the country in which it is rendered” implies, these grounds apply to both domestic and foreign awards.
Georgian legislation does not define the concept of public policy. However, Georgian courts have addressed this issue in several decisions.
The Tbilisi Court of Appeals, in its decision of 25 March, 2014 (case N2ბ/4963-12) determined that “the interpretation of the contractual provisions reflected in the arbitration award, the assessment of evidence, and the qualification of the legal relationship cannot be reviewed by referring to public order, because public order does not include any kind of violation, but rather the disregard of fundamental principles of law; i.e., in other words, in order for an arbitration award to be annulled on the grounds of conflict with public order, it must conflict with higher values; otherwise, public order will turn into an appeal mechanism for arbitration awards. Such approach is contrary to the purpose of the Law of Georgia on Arbitration – to ensure finality of arbitration awards.”
The Supreme Court of Georgia, in its decision of 20 January 2022 (case Nა-5322-შ-127-2020) drew a distinction between material and procedural public policy. The Court held that procedural public policy primarily concerns the fairness of the proceedings, while material public policy relates to the substance of the decision. The Supreme Court equated public policy (ordre public) with the fundamental legal principles of Georgia.
More recently, the Supreme Court of Georgia, in its decision of 28 October 2025 (case Nა-2887-შ-72-2025) concluded that “public policy is a set of fundamental economic, legal, moral, political, religious and social standards of all states and international organizations (extra-national community).” The Court confirmed that not every violation of law or inconsistency with domestic law constitutes a violation of public policy, and that the relevant question for enforcement purposes is not whether the award as a whole violates public policy, but whether the enforcement of the award would by its nature constitute such a violation.